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Refugees’ subjectivities, debit cards and data circuits. Financial-humanitarianism in 
the Greek migration laboratory.  
(forthcoming in International Political Sociology) 
Martina Tazzioli (Swansea University) 
Introduction:  
In 2017 the UNHCR announced the forthcoming launch of a join-data centre in collaboration with 
the World Bank “on forced displacement to greatly improve statistics on refugees, other displaced 
people and host communities” (UNHCR, 2017a). This joint data-centre will store data and informa-
tion on refugee displacement situations. The UNHCR promotes the future joint-data centre as a re-
sult of the effort to articulate development-based responses to displacement and humanitarian inter-
ventions, considering these latter as no longer sufficient for responding to the ongoing global 
“refugee crisis”. The increasing role of the World Bank in refugee governmentality is part of pecu-
liar processes of financialisation of humanitarianism, and of the mutual entanglements between se-
curity practices, datafication of mobility and humanitarian interventions. More broadly, digital and 
biometric technologies  have been widely adopted in the field of refugee humanitarianism and, in 
particular, in refugee camps that host the displaced Syrian population in Jordan, Lebanon, Greece 
and Turkeys (Hoffmann, 2017; Jacobsen, 2017) .  This paper engages with these ongoing techno-1
political re-assemblages used for governing refugees’ mobility and presence, by focusing on the 
implementation of prepaid cards for asylum seekers in Greece. Notably, since 2015 Greece has been 
a European laboratory of experimentation of migration policies, laws and political technologies, and 
it is the first European country where a Refugee Cash Assistance Programme had been launched 
and funded by the EU, and coordinated by the UNHCR. According to the Programme, all asylum 
seekers who arrived in Greece after January 2015 and who hold an asylum card or a temporary au-
thorisation are entitled to get a monthly financial support which is deposited on a prepaid card sup-
ported by the financial actor Prepaid Financial Services based in London. The cards, which are dis-
 In Turkey the EU funded a project through the Emergency Social Safety Net: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/essn_en.  At 1
Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan and in refugee camps in Lebanon, asylum seekers are given debit cards that are 
recharged on a monthly basis through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in collaboration with UNHCR 
and with Amman-Cairo Bank. Nevertheless, the use of “humanitarian refugee biometrics” (Jacobsen, 
2017)  can be traced back as far as the early 2000s. 
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tributed in  can be used to withdraw cash at ATM machines in Greece and to buy products in the 
shops. 
The Greek case is particularly helpful, I suggest, for coming to grips with three main conceptual 
points: first, to interrogate the use of financial tools in refugee governmentality, questioning narra-
tives on financial inclusion; second, to investigate the  infrastructures of data circulation and the 
biopolitical modes of value extraction that are connected to it; third, to explore how refugee subjec-
tivities are shaped by financial-humanitarianism. Throughout the paper I use the expression “finan-
cial-humanitarianism” to refer to the increasing use of financial tools – such as prepaid cards – in 
the field of refugee governmentality and, more broadly, to point to the entanglements between fi-
nancial technologies and humanitarian practices in controlling, selecting and managing asylum 
seekers. Speaking of financial-humanitarianism allows us to think in terms other than that of fi-
nance colonising the field of humanitarianism, and to highlight instead the mechanisms of control 
and government that are enacted through such an assemblage (Gago, 2017). As I illustrate later in 
the paper, the focus on humanitarianism here is explained by the fact that these digital and financial 
tools are deployed specifically in refugee camps and hotspots, and only asylum seekers are eligible 
to the financial support. Prepaid cards are seen here as part of political technologies for governing 
refugees. I borrow the expression “political technologies” from Michel Foucault, using it in the spe-
cific sense of the set of knowledges, practices and operations “which determine the conduct of indi-
viduals and submit them to certain ends or domination” (Foucault, 1988: 18) . Pushing this further, 2
a focus on political technologies sheds light on the materiality of politics and, at once, the politics of 
materiality through which abstract and general terms like humanitarianism are de facto actualised 
and enforce exclusion, obstacles and hierarchies of lives.  
This paper builds on fieldwork that I conducted in Greece in April and July 2017 and in August 
2018 – in Athens and on the islands of Chios and Lesvos. As part of that fieldwork, I conducted in-
terviews with the actors involved in the Refugee Cash Assistance Programme, with Greek authori-
ties and with migrants who received the prepaid cards or who have remained excluded from these . 3
However, this paper is not an ethnography of the Greek refugee hosting system nor of the Cash As-
sistance Programme. Rather it does an analysis of financial-humanitarianism articulating empirical 
More widely, and following Foucault, dealing with political technologies means refusing to adopt a juridical model of 2
power, predicated upon interdiction and law, in favour of an analysis that looks at what is produced by power relations.
 I conducted interviews with UNHCR, with the Greek Asylum Office and with the European Asylum Support Office 3
(EASO), with NGOs involved in the Cash Assistance Programme (the Hellenic Red Cross, the International Rescue 
Committee and Caritas). In London I interviewed the financial actor Prepaid Financial Services. I met and interviewed 
asylum seekers outside the hotspots and refugee camps, as well as at Refugee City Plaza Hotel in Athens. 
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material collected on the ground with a close reading of official statements and documents pub-
lished by the UNHCR, NGOs, financial actors and the EU.  
By mobilising such an analytical angle on financial-humanitarianism, this essay brings a contribu-
tion to works that investigate “the relations between government, politics and technology” (Barry, 
2001: 2), showing how refugees’ mobility and presence are disciplined while at the same time be-
come object of activities of data extraction and circulation. More precisely, it draws on works which 
have explored processes of datafication of mobility actualised through the implementation of digital 
borders (Amoore, 2013; Broeders, 2007; Scheel, 2013) and through a “politics of humanitarian 
technology” (Jacobsen, 2017; Jacobsen, Sandvik, 2018). In relation to this literature, this paper in-
terrogates the modes of capitalisation and data extraction which build on migrant conducts and mo-
bility, arguing that this remains quite unexplored in the above literature. Scholars widely paid atten-
tion to the possible or actual tracking of migrants associated to the use of technologies, this essay 
shifts the attention away from a security-based perspective and considers the Cash Assistance Pro-
gramme as a political technology for governing refugee populations in transit. Relatedly, this paper 
contends, the implementation of cards for refugees should be studied in conjunction with forms of 
spatial fixation imposed on the migrants and with implementation of other technologies - such as, in 
Greece, the Skype call system to claim asylum - which partly obstruct migrants from accessing their 
rights and obfuscate to the migrants the overall functioning of the asylum process. 
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, it analyses the financialisation of refugee 
support in Greece in the light of the Greek migration context and shows that the Refugee Cash As-
sistance Programme serves to govern populations in transit more than for purposes of financial in-
clusion. In the second section it brings attention to the way in which the financialisation of refugee 
mobility shapes refugee subjectivities as well as to the forms of biopolitical value that are generat-
ed. The final section considers the modes of data circulation and the spatial fixations and geograph-
ical restrictions that asylum seekers are subjected to, in order to be entitled to debit cards and to the 
monthly top up.   
Governing populations in transit:  
Since 2015 Greece has been a laboratory for EU migration policies and one of the main sites where 
the “marketisation of humanitarian action” (Franck, 2018: 201) has been staged widely. The tempo-
ral conjunction between the economic backlash in Greece and the increasing arrival of people seek-
ing asylum has opened up spaces of intervention for European actors, international organisations 
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and NGOs. As Bernd Kasparek has pointed out, there are significant “parallels between the Euro-
crisis and the ‘refugee crisis’ ” (Kasparek, 2016); more precisely, in Greece the government of and 
through the “crisis” has been characterised by migration being used as a money of exchange in EU-
Greece negotiations (Neilson, 2018). Security and humanitarian interventions on the part of Eu-
ropean agencies, IGOs and NGOs in Greece for managing migrants on the islands and on the main-
land do not consist only in financial support but also in the deployment of personnel and technical 
equipment. To some extent, at stake in Greece is a partial Europeanisation of the management of 
Greece’s “refugee crisis”. In addition to this, the interventions made by European and International 
actors consist also in direct actions in the Greek space.  
The implementation of the refugee Cash Assistance Programme should be situated in this field of 
tensions between international and European actors and Greek authorities, and it has been presented 
a response to what European states have called a “refugee crisis” – although here I build on literat-
ure that radically challenges the states’ “crisis” narrative as such (Bojadžijev, Mezzadra, 2015; Kas-
parek, 2016). Importantly, the Cash Assistance Programme is the actualisation of what can be called 
the internal externalisation of refugee governmentality in Greece: indeed, the Greek authorities are 
not involved in the Programme which is run by international organisations and supported by the EU 
and by a foreigner financial actor based in London. The Cash Assistance in Greece has been funded 
by the European Commission Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA) 
through the European Civil Protection Mechanism (ECHO) that between March 2016 and April 
2018 delivered 605 million euros in humanitarian aid and 57.6 million Euros for Cash Assistance in 
2017 (UNHCR, 2017b). ESTIA promotes the Programme as a mechanism that “restores dignity and 
empowers asylum-seekers and refugees who can now choose how to cover their basic needs” (ES-
TIA, 2018). Greece represents a case in point for interrogating how the financialisation of refugee 
support and controls has been fostered in conjuncture with the economic backlash in Greece and 
how this has contributed to reshaping the EU’s migration governmentality.  
Unlike in Italy, where the management of the reception system and of migrants’ arrivals remains 
quite centralised and led by Italian institutions, in Greece refugee camps had been opened through 
EU funding. Similarly, the hotspots, located on five Greek islands (Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros 
and Kos) are characterised by the massive presence of NGO personnel, as well as of European ac-
tors, with these latter playing the twofold role of supporting and monitoring Greek authorities 
(Spathopolou, 2016). At the same time, the signing of the EU-Turkey Deal in March 2016 has 
paved the way for European actors to supervise the Greek asylum procedure. The European Asylum 
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Support Office (EASO) is in charge of advising Greek authorities about asylum claims laid on the 
islands, in order to evaluate case by case whether asylum seekers can be admitted to the ordinary 
asylum procedure or be considered ineligible – on the basis of the clause included in the EU-Turkey 
Deal which establishes Turkey as a “safe country”. Unfolding the manifold aspects of the Greek 
laboratory of migration policies is in fact crucial for situating the debit cards for refugees as part of 
a broader humanitarian-security government of migration that in Greece has been consolidated 
through the implementation of the Hotspot System (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). 
Indeed, digital technologies have been increasingly playing a central role in the daily activities of 
refugee agencies and NGOs, structuring a new mode of intervention defined as digital humanitari-
anism. This latter consists in ‘‘the enacting of social and institutional networks, technologies, and 
practices that enable large, unrestricted numbers of remote and on-the-ground individuals to collab-
orate on humanitarian management through digital technologies’’ (Burns 2014; see also Duffield, 
2016). Digital technologies are used for facilitating the counting of “people of concern” inside 
refugee camps, for improving the communication between NGOs and asylum seekers, for medical 
assistance and for generating interactive maps to coordinate the prompt intervention of humanitari-
ans. However, it is important to take a distance from modes of techno-optimism and from what Tom 
Scott-Smith called “humanitarian neophilia” (Scott-Smith, 2016) to address the race to innovation 
in the field of humanitarianism.  
Scholars have investigated the race to technological innovation in the field of refugee humanitarian-
ism (Jacobsen, Sandvik, 2018; Jacobsen, 2015; Hoffmann, 2017; Read et al. 2016) and financial 
practices in migration governance (Datta, 2012). Yet, the processes of partial financialisation of 
refugee humanitarianism have remained quite unexplored until now, although with few exceptions 
(Martin, 2017; Rota, 2018). In the field of international relations and security studies, the datafica-
tion of mobility is the object of a mushrooming literature, (Amoore, 2013; Aradau, Blanke, 2017; 
Broeders, Dijstelbloem, 2015; Jeandesboz, 2011; Scheel, 2013) and is often situated within an ana-
lytical framework that addresses the “technologization of security” (Ceyhan, 2002). Some works 
have approached the topic by analysing the new modes of control that the datafication of migration 
movements has enforced. An emerging array of literature tries to “follow the data” collected by fi-
nancial actors, security firms or national authorities (De Goede, 2017; De Goode, Wesseling, 2017), 
and engages with the forms of “financial security” (Amicelle, 2011) that have been activated in col-
laboration of banks and security actors, to contrast illegal activities.  It is important to remark that 
prepaid cards for refugees are not taken here per se but as the material crystallisation of exclusion-
ary mechanisms of government, knowledges and processes of capitalisation. Indeed, as suggested 
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by Amicelle and colleagues. “devices are not just ‘things’: they are techniques and instruments em-
bedded in social practices, deployed in configurations of power, and creating new distributions of 
visibility, modes of thought and subjective dispositions” (Amicelle et al. 2015: 297). 
Humanitarian cash-based assistance has been promoted by the European Commission as a mecha-
nisms “quick to deliver, cost-effective” and as tools that “provide people in need with greater 
choice” (EU, 2018). Nevertheless, the implementation of financial tools in the field of refugee gov-
ernmentality responds neither to a logic of “financial inclusion” nor to one of total refugee trace-
ability – monitoring of refugees’ movements. Instead, it should be considered as one of the hetero-
geneous techniques through which states and non-state actors try to regain control,  not so much on 
singular asylum seekers but on refugee movements and populations at large – extracting value, at 
the same time, from refugees’ temporary presence. It follows that a critical approach to the assem-
blages of financial-humanitarianism involves cautioning against taking financialisation as an over-
whelming grid through which to analyse the transformations going on in the field of refugee gov-
ernmentality.  
In fact, the dimension of financialisation of refugee humanitarianism cannot be overstated, nor tak-
en as a linear process: rather, it should be approached by looking at the ways in which it is inter-
twined with racialised disciplinary techniques, modes of spatial fixations and “administrative vio-
lence” (Butler, 2017). To what extent can we speak of a financialisation of political technologies for 
governing refugees? The use of the term financialisation has spread widely in the fields of social 
sciences and political economy, becoming to some degree an overwhelming grid for signifying mul-
tiple processes: the financialisation of everyday life (Martin, 2002); the dominant role of the finance 
sector in the global economy through the centrality of “fictitious capital” (Durand, 2017); the 
“hegemony of rent” (Mezzadra, Gago, 2017: 478), as the present main mode of capital accumula-
tion (Marazzi, 2011). However, far from applying the analytical grid of financialisaton as such to 
the refugee context, we need to investigate the actual functioning of digital and financial technolo-
gies, drawing attention to the impact that these have on would-be refugees and the ways in which 
humanitarian intervention gets transformed. This does not mean getting rid of the semantic field of 
financialisation but, rather, pointing to the peculiar modes in which financial tools and a certain fi-
nancial logic have been incorporated and put to work in governing refugees.  
At a first glance, the Refugee Cash Assistance Programme appears as a mechanism that instantiates 
a quite homogenising “hold” over migrants – using the card for everybody in the place of discrimi-
nating criteria – and enacts a mode of control through inclusion by incorporating the asylum seekers 
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into financial circuits. By bringing attention to the effective ways in which the financialisation of 
refugee humanitarianism is played out by international organisations in Greece, it emerges that the 
Refugee Cash Assistance is predicated upon exclusionary criteria. Only migrants who get the Greek 
Asylum Card or who have a valid document issued by the Greek police match the eligibility crite-
ria . Thus, financial-humanitarianism appears as a forced nexus for the migrants: access to financial 4
support depends on access to the channels of asylum. In turn, claiming asylum in Greece is far from 
being a smooth affair: some migrants see the asylum procedure as a sort of spatial trap which ham-
pers them from seeking protection in other EU countries, while others are preventively excluded 
from this, being labelled as ineligible on the basis of the EU-Turkey Deal and therefore become de-
portable to Turkey.  In anyway, to be targeted by these tools of financial supports are only those mi-
grants who are legally subjectivised as asylum seekers and who comply with the spatial discipline 
of humanitarianism. 
 Temporariness does in fact characterize the Cash Assistance Programme in Greece: migrants are 
eligible for the prepaid cards until they get a final response to their asylum application and, in case 
of appeal, until the final stage of it. More precisely, the temporary financialisation of asylum seek-
ers’ presence is followed, in many cases, by their illegalisation (due to the denial of international 
protection)  or by their forced removal . Hence, the Greek space of migration containment enables 5 6
highlighting the disjunctures between mechanisms of migrants’  temporary incorporation into finan-
cial circuits and their legal destitution. However, the fact that the Refugee Cash Assistance is not 
aimed at asylum seekers’ financial inclusion does not mean that such temporary financial history 
will necessarily be without a follow-up. By that I refer to the increasing centrality played by alterna-
tive data credit scoring, which consists in techniques of data collection and data mining for widen-
ing access to credit for individuals who lack of a credit history. Rob Aitken points to the “particular 
kind of financialisation” that alternative data credit scoring generates: “credit scoring experiments 
are attempts to constitute and extract financial value from the places where it is invisible” (Aitken, 
2017: 275), without however strengthening processes of financial inclusion. On the contrary, alter-
native data scoring, he contends, contributes to new mechanisms of exclusionary sorting, tracing 
http://refucomm.com/infopacks/greece-mainland/living-in-greece/cash-assistance-programme/en/greece-mainland_liv4 -
ing-in-greece_cash-assistance-programme_EN.pdf
 About 70% of the migrants lodging an asylum claim in Greece were in fact denied international protection 5
in 2016 and 56% in 2017 (http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Dashboard-
August-2017.png). 
 On the basis of the EU-Turkey Deal migrants claiming asylum on Greek islands can be sent back to Turkey 6
if they do not pass the admissibility interview, that is if Turkey is reckoned to be a “safe country” for them.
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profiles of risky subjects who are considered too unreliable to get access to the credit system. Al-
though this is not directly at play in the Greek migration context, it represents a terrain for further 
research agendas which want to consider how migrants who are temporarily included within finan-
cial circuits as asylum seekers can also be the object of extractive processes – data collection – that 
are the basis of future alternative credit scoring mechanisms. 
Data circuits and biopolitical value:  
Sven Optiz and Ute Tellmans’s argument that “the envisioned infrastructural space is not coexten-
sive with Europe’s political boundaries” (Opitz, Tellman, 2015: 178: see also Walters, 2015) is par-
ticularly inspiring for looking at the circuits of financial-humanitarianism; these latter consist of the 
virtual spaces of governmentality that stem from data sharing and data circulation activities. Far 
from being a seamless logistics of data circulation, the circuits of financial-humanitarianism are 
characterised by moments of non-circulation which depend on interruptions, frictions, technical 
jams and local resistances, as well as by institutional chokepoints. Indeed, as Kevin Donovan right-
ly pointed out, “the infrastructure of humanitarianism […] is an incomplete, heterogenous assem-
blage, prone to failure and in need of constant maintenance and repair” (Donovan, 2015: 744). 
However, more than failures, these local obstructions and decelerations are the outcome of political 
frictions. Together with the material “spaces of governmentality” (Tazzioli, 2015), such as detention 
practices, security measures and humanitarian interventions, there are digital circuits of control that 
are far less visible and much harder to map. Even in these more invisible fields of intervention – 
datafication and financialisation of refugee mobility – in Greece both the EU and international or-
ganisations such as the UNHCR play a fundamental role. 
I observed the debit card registration and delivery processes inside Eleonas refugee camp in Athens 
and on the island of Chios. In both cases, migrants used to queue outside UNHCR stands to get the 
monthly top up or to register for the first time. In Chios, until the dismantling of Souda refugee 
camp in September 2017, the debit card registration took place both inside the Vial hotspot and out-
side Souda refugee camp. At the gate of Souda camp I got the opportunity to see how the registra-
tion and delivery of the debit cards work. Both in Souda and in Eleonas refugee camps, for as long 
as migrants enter the stand, UNHCR officers check in the database whether they have already regis-
tered and if they are effectively staying in that reception center, in order to avoid what can be called 
“card shopping”; that is, they verify that the migrant does not hold two or more cards and thus get 
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more than one monthly top up. “We need to be very careful before confirming the payment”, an 
NGO officer clarified to me while he was checking migrants’ documents in Chios, outside Souda 
camp; “in fact, migrants have learnt how the system works and also its glitches, and therefore some 
move across Greece, from one reception centre to another, in order to get multiple recharges at the 
same time, since there are still problems of inter-communicability among the different databases” . 7
Instead, those who need to get the card for the first time have to provide the personal data requested 
(nationality, gender, age), and their legal status is checked. The data is then stored by the personnel 
onto iPads and is uploaded in real-time into two databases (ProGres and CashAssist). “I’m sorry but 
we cannot give you the card, yet. You do not match the criteria”: this sentence has been uttered 
many times by UNHCR officers during the debit card distribution in Chios. An asylum seeker from 
Mali complained that he had already claimed asylum and he had been waiting for his asylum card 
for three months, while next to him a man from Nigeria was explaining that the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) was keeping his asylum card, and so he could not show it to the NGO. Ac-
tually, in some cases migrants are reluctant to be temporarily included in the circuits of financial-
humanitarianism: “some prefer to hide on the island, refusing both humanitarian and financial sup-
port in order that state authorities lose trace of them’ . 8
Thus, the introduction of debit cards in refugee support programmes entails both the implementa-
tion  of digital technologies and the activation of data circuits – formed by the transactions made by 
refugees and the data collected by the authorities to enrol the migrants onto the Refugee Cash As-
sistance Programme. Furthermore, the data and the information collected are used and shared in 
combination with other data gathered from migrants upon landing, during identification procedures. 
The use of debit cards for asylum seekers is expected to streamline the work of humanitarianism by 
getting rid of the material and complex logistics of cash and provision distribution in refugee 
camps. Yet, the use of financial tools in refugee humanitarianism enhances another, more virtual, 
type of logistics, which concerns the activities of data circulation and data sharing. How are the data 
and information collected shared among the different actors? How is the data used? As scholars 
have pointed out, there cannot be data valorisation without circulation (Aradau, Blanke, 2017; 
Bourne et al. 2015). Nathaniel O’Grady has remarked that “the capacity of data to transform into 
information relies … on its capacity to move and how this movement is conditioned within the 
broader digital infrastructure in which it moves” (O’Grady, 2017: 76). Hence, both the material in-
 Interview with the manager of Souda Refugee camp, Chios April 21, 2017.7
 Interview with the manager of Souda refugee camp, Chios, July 16th 2017. 8
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frastructures of data circulation and the modes of data sharing are fundamental for understanding 
how the financialisation of humanitarianism intersects with mechanisms of control and government. 
In other words, what counts is not so much the data per se, extracted from single transactions, but 
how it is (or it is not) shared and how it circulates.  
How and with whom does the UNHCR share (and not share) the data collected from debit cards 
beneficiaries?  On a technical level, despite the attempt to centralise all the data gathered, there are 
problems of data miscommunication, which often make it hard to double check whether a migrant 
who is receiving monthly financial support in a refugee camp had already registered for Cash As-
sistance in another one. However, the partially obstructed circuits of financial-humanitarianism 
cannot be reduced to technical mismatches. Since the UNHCR took over leadership of the Cash As-
sistance Programme, in April 2017, all data has been stored and owned by the UNHCR. The NGOs 
involved in the project - currently, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the International Federation 
of the Red Cross (IFRC) - do have access to the UNHCR database only partially, while the rest is 
available to them on request. The politics of data sharing between non-governmental actors and the 
Greek authorities is under negotiation: while the UNHCR declares that the data is not shared with 
the Greek authorities, the Greek Asylum Office gets access to some basic information collected for 
the Cash Assistance Programme, complaining that they would prefer to have more direct control 
over it.  
The data collected at the moment of the asylum seekers’ registration into the Cash Assistance pro-
gramme is stored in the UNHCR’s central database ProGres 4 - which includes personal data and 
the information of concern about each asylum seeker, among which his/her status - and in the 
CashAssist database. This latter, like ProGres 4, is owned and managed by the UNHCR and con-
tains only data about asylum seekers as “beneficiaries” of cash assistance programmes: these in-
clude the registration date into the cash system; the transactions made by the beneficiaries; updated 
information about their eligibility; amount of money received; name of the main family member. 
This second database is the digital interface between the UNHCR and the bank (PFS). In turn, PFS 
has also an autonomous database with the real-time transactions. PFS is not interested in tracking 
refugees’ movements, nor in knowing if they are in the country legally or not: the Cash Assistance 
Programme is in fact conceived as a temporary measure by PFS, which is aware that the huge ma-
jority of the beneficiaries "will never become a client of a bank; or even if they will do, will never 
have much to put into their bank account” . Thus, asylum seekers are not subjectivized as (poten9 -
 Interview with Prepaid Financial Services, London, 18 January 2018.9
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tial) customers but, rather, as a sort of temporary tenants of financial-humanitarianism. UNHCR’s 
officers can get access in real-time to asylum seekers’ transactions, as well as to the exact locations 
where the ‘beneficiaries’ took cash from ATM machines or used the cards in shops. Hence, 
refugees’ internal displacements are de facto mapped in real time. Nevertheless, the UNHCR is cur-
rently using the data collected to produce general surveys about refugees’ purchases rather than to 
follow people’s movements across the country. To be precise, the UNHCR collects information 
about refugees' consumption and behaviours through the Post-distribution Monitoring, which con-
sists in a customer-based questionnaire addressed to the asylum seekers who receive the prepaid 
cards. It follows that the kind of data which is used the most is not the digital information extracted 
at the moment of the registration or by tracking the financial transactions: rather, migrants are sub-
jected to a constant interpellation, as long as they are asked to speak about their use of the prepaid 
cards. Hence, it could be argued that on the one hand data per se is not enough, since the supple-
ment of subjectivity and speech are required; while on the other hand, as a UNHCR officer told me 
“we already have too much of data, we do not know how to do with that” .  10
Indeed, neither the Greek authorities nor  international organisations have interest in tracking mi-
grants individually and keeping them in the country; instead, they are incinded in studying refugees' 
needs and conducts, strengthening at the same time a certain sense of self-responsibility on refugees 
themselves. It follows that, more than tracking people on an individual basis, the financialisation of 
humanitarian support of asylum seekers is a mode for temporarily governing migrants in transit, 
producing knowledge about refugee populations in terms of conducts, consumptions and financial 
behaviours. Such a mechanism introduces a sort of fixed-term financialisation of refugee lives, con-
ditioned to spatial fixation and makes possible a capitalisation over their temporary forced presence 
in Greece. Notably, a growing literature has studied the functioning of the so called “migration in-
dustry” (Cranston et al. 2017; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013; Nyberg-Sørensen 2012) exploring the 
interweaving between the security industry, migration management and new technologies, and 
bringing attention the central role played by private actors and hi-tech corporations in streamlining 
identification procedures in refugee reception centres (Andersson, 2014a). Nevertheless, as Lauren 
Martin has pointed out, “we need to ask how specific forms of value are produced, calculated, and 
circulated from the policing, rerouting, and containment of human mobility” (Martin, 2018). In oth-
er words, does the (partial) financialisation of refugee support contribute to enforcing a particular 
mode of value extraction from refugees’ presence and mobility? Which forms of economic value 
 Interview with the UNHCR coordinator of the Cash Assistsance Programme, Athens, August, 2018.10
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are at stake in the circuits of financial-humanitarianism?  Daniela Gabor and Sally Brooks discuss 
programmes of financial inclusion by convincingly speaking of unbanked populations in relation to 
“global strategies of capital accumulation through digital footprints, a project particularly apt for 
(chaotically) shaping financial(ised) subjectivities” (Gabor, Brooks, 2017: 2). By raising the ques-
tion of value and the processes of accumulation that are at stake in the field of refugee humanitari-
anism, I build on Brett Neilson’s suggestion to explore “how the practices of exclusion and differ-
ential inclusion that characterize border and migration regimes intersect modes of capitalist val-
orization and extraction” (Neilson, 2018: 379). In order to grasp the forms of value that are pro-
duced through the circuits of financial-humanitarianism we need to broaden the inquiry beyond in-
vestigation about the economic profit made by states and private actors from migrant detention, as 
well as from the huge investments in border security enforcement. This is in fact also the case in the 
hotspots and refugee camps in Greece, where, as in all other reception centres, there is a capitalisa-
tion over migrants’ protracted presence.  
However, such an analytical angle should be articulated with a study of mechanisms of value pro-
duction that rely on migrants’ mobility, conducts and behaviours. This involves, as Ruben Anders-
son remarkably points out, considering “forms of profiting and predating on people on the move” 
which rely on “the extraction — and generation — of value from human beings’ vitality in the 
broadest sense, reaching from physical features to bodily presence, and from the capacity to move 
to the psychological experience of lived time” (Andersson, 2018: 414). To understand the data-
economy chain, one needs to analyse closely the activities performed by the actors involved in Cash 
Assistance: the UNHCR collects data about refugees as “beneficiaries” of this financial service and 
generates surveys concerning migrants’ purchases. It is in this specific sense that I propose to use 
speak about biopolitical value: through such an expression I refer to the ways in which migrants’ 
lives  and mobility are object of capitalisation and become a source of value on a twofold level: as 11
individual conducts and as refugee populations. These modes of value extraction, that capitalise on 
refugees' mobility and conducts, supplement, I suggest, forms of value produced through the direct 
exploitation of migrant labour force or through the migrant detention industry. Yet, on this point 
some conceptual clarification is needed. The financial actor involved in the programme is Pre-Paid 
Financial Services (PFS). PFS earns 6 euros for every new debit card, plus a fee is paid to the com-
pany by the UNHCR for every transaction made by refugees. However, the main gain made by PFS 
is less a direct economic profit, which is quite small, than in terms of “humanitarian brand”. In oth-
 Not in a biological sense but as conducts and behaviours.11
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er words, would-be refugees do not constitute a new economic sector in itself for financial actors; 
rather, humanitarianism as a concept is what they capitalise upon. Hence, humanitarianism has be-
come a new frontier of accumulation – what Mezzadra and Neilson also defined as “frontiers of 
capital” (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013) – both as direct source of value and data extraction, and as sym-
bolic capital. 
Both the data gathered and migrants’ financial conduct – their transactions – are potential sources of 
value to the extent that they are shared among state authorities, private and financial actors, and that 
they are used for instance to produce surveys about their behaviour as consumers, as well as about 
their internal displacement in the country. Second, the biopolitical dimension concerns both the di-
mension of life, broadly speaking – going well beyond the biological level, to include refugees’ be-
haviour and conduct – and, together with this, practices of mobility. In fact, beyond the commodifi-
cation of migrant bodies and the profit made out of migrants’ protracted detention, migrants become 
a source of value also insofar as they circulate and use money across the country. Finally, together 
with the dimension of life (as conducts) and mobility, the circuits of heterogeneous data collected 
from the migrants should also be considered part of the digitalised economy of humanitarianism. 
Temporary financialised subjectivities: 
Financial-humanitarianism contributes to a defining of asylum seekers as subjects who, on the one 
hand, should actively contribute to their own government and confinement, while on the other are 
expected to become temporarily autonomous: migrants are not included in financial circuits as such 
but only temporarily incorporated. The injunction to become an autonomous subject can be partly 
read in light of what Suzan Ilcan and Kim Rygiel called “resiliency humanitarianism”: this refers to 
the increasing centrality played by resilience within humanitarian rationales and programmes. As 
part of this humanitarian script, camps are no longer seen as places of transit but as “permanent 
spaces of settlement with the potential for developing community and entrepreneurial populations”, 
and on the other “refugees are reconstituted along the lines of the neoliberal subject, from passive 
recipients of aid to camp “residents” and resilient subjects” (Ilcan, Rygiel, 2015: 334). Therefore, 
according to this humanitarian rationale, asylum seekers are shaped as subjects who deal with and 
adapt to adversity - erasing in this way the reality of the struggles for rights - and at the same time 
as subjects who need to empower themselves.  
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Does the Refugee Cash Assistance represent an example of resiliency humanitarianism ? Does the 
Greek refugee context shed light on humanitarianism as a “liberal diagnostic” (Reid-Henry, 2014) 
of the state and market transformations ? If we take into account both the rationale behind the im-
plementation of financial tools for refugees in Greece and its current functioning, the analytical grid 
of resilience and refugee empowerment helps only partially to grasp the peculiar assemblages of 
financial tools, humanitarianism and digital technologies. On the one hand, works on neoliberal 
humanitarianism enable situating single case studies into a broader trend that concerns humanitarian 
rationale and practices (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018) - according to which asylum seekers are depicted 
not as subjects of rights but as temporary beneficiaries of financial and humanitarian services. On 
the other, that analytical perspective should be nuanced in light of the peculiarities of the Greek 
refugee context, as a space of transit and containment at the same time. Moreover, I contend that the 
“neoliberal” label obfuscates, more than helping in analysing in-depth, the specificity of political 
technologies (Aradau, 2014; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013). In particular, I do not see the partial finan-
cialisation and digitalisation of humanitarianism as a direct expression of neoliberal humanitarian-
ism. Rather, as I show throughout the article, the spread use of debit cards in refugee governmental-
ity is intertwined with disciplinary modes of governing refugee lives, which include protracted spa-
tial containment, as well as with legal destitution and forms of administrative violence.  
First, the Cash Assistance Programme, as well as most of the humanitarian initiatives, has been 
conceived as a temporary measure, insofar as refugees were posited to be in transit. Therefore, asy-
lum seekers are not expected to become active residents of the camps nor of the refugee community. 
This is in fact the narrative used by the UNHCR and by the EU about the “refugee crisis” in Greece, 
despite in reality since 2016 thousands of migrants have remained stranded in the country or 
blocked on the islands, due to the closure of the Balkan Route. Thus, migrants in Greece are depict-
ed as refugee populations in transit despite their protracted strandedness - what can be called 
“stranded in transit”. Second, the delivery of debit cards in refugee camps does not mean for the 
migrants less dependency from the  modes of humanitarian discipline and control. On the contrary, 
migrants are obliged to comply with spatial restrictions, to show up at the monthly card 
registration , and to orient themselves into a complex techno-humanitarian constellation made of 
papers, misfunctioning technologies and scattered information. In fact, an analysis that looks at po-
litical technologies of government cannot overshadow the disciplining effects that are generated 
through such a temporary financialisation of refugees’ presence and mobility. In fact, governing 
should not be conflated with direct control, nor with surveillance; rather, building on Foucault, I 
consider it here as the act of structuring “the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1982: 
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790). How are migrants’ subjectivities shaped by processes of financialisation of humanitarian sup-
port when they are beneficiaries of debit cards? More than transforming migrants into self-govern-
ing subjects and beneficiaries of financial services, techniques of financial-humanitarianism extract 
data from migrants in transit that are only temporarily targeted by such a system of control-and-
support. While migrants who benefit from the Cash Assistance Programme are addressed by the in-
junction to (temporarily) become autonomous subjects, this should not be confused with a neoliber-
al subjectivities model, such as for instance the homo oeconomicus.  
Migrants’ temporary incorporation into financial-humanitarian circuits is disjoined from the actual 
possibility for the migrants themselves to become (economically) “autonomous”: indeed, the same 
migrants who are temporarily incorporated within financial circuits can soon after be subjected to 
legal destitution – e.g. getting denial of  international protection and becoming “deportable” (De 
Genova, 2004). This is particularly glaring on the Greek islands, where migrants are targeted by ge-
ographical restrictions due to the EU-Turkey Deal. That is, the invisible circuits of data crisscross 
the material infrastructures and the fences of the hotspot: the majority of those who benefit from the 
Cash Assistance Programme will be denied refugee status and, being illegalized, will not meet the 
legal and material conditions to get access to bank circuits, nor to be free from mechanisms of ex-
ploitation and domination. At the same time, the fact that some migrants are labelled as non-eligible 
for cash assistance is not a technical limit of the system or a gap that can be filled in; rather, it is 
constitutive of political technologies for producing and governing refugees which are predicated 
upon specific norm of conduct migrants need to comply with and upon the the tracing of hierarchies 
and partitions among migrants themselves. Therefore, at a close glance it appears that asylum seek-
ers’ subjectivities are shaped not as truly consumers and not even as truly citizens: rather, they are 
pushed to temporarily behave as if they were citizens, regardless of their effective legal status and 
of the high chance to be denied of the refugee status. In so doing, asylum seekers are crafted as 
para-citizens, that is as subjects who are demanded to act as responsible consumers and citizens, 
even if they are then excluded from protection and thus, are illegalised.  
The distinctive character of financial-humanitarianism in refugee governmentality is its sheer tem-
porariness, which clashes with the liberal script of a self-entrepreneurial subject that shapes himself 
according to the injunction “manage yourself!” (Lorey, 2015). Instead, in the Greek migration con-
text migrants are selectively captured into programmes of digital governmentality on a fixed-term 
basis: if they escape the reception system, and when they get the final response – positive or nega-
tive – on their asylum claim they also stop receiving the monthly cash assistance. Thus, the intro-
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duction of financial tools in governing refugees in Greece should not be confused with modes of 
governing through debt. The government of the indebted man is structured around a twofold obliga-
tion for the subject who “not only considers himself as human capital which must valorise his in-
vestments (debts made to study), but also feels obliged to act, to think and to behave as if he were 
an individual enterprise” (Lazzarato, 2012: 56). In his analysis of the economy of debt, Lazzarato 
puts at the core the production of subjectivity: debt, he contends, “functions as a mechanism for the 
production and government of collective and individual subjectivities” (Lazzarato, 2012: 29) by 
“keeping the person over which power is exercised free” (31), while at the same time instantiating a 
moralisation of the unemployed subject.  
Yet, shifting the attention to the government of asylum seekers through financial-humanitarianism a 
quite different constellation of power relations emerges. Indeed, the possibility for the subjects to 
valorise themselves over time is hampered from the start, due to the short-term length of the 
Refugee Cash Assistance Programme conceived for supporting (some) migrants only until their le-
gal status is determined. Therefore, on the one hand the implementation of the debit card system 
pushes asylum seekers to be temporarily more independent in the sense of relying on direct humani-
tarian assistance; yet, on the other, financial-humanitarianism does not shape autonomous subjectiv-
ities. On the contrary, migrants who get the debit cards are requested to follow the norms of conduct 
of humanitarianism – at the mercy of the indefinite waiting time of asylum procedures – without 
being effectively  supported by humanitarian actors. To put it differently, the condition of tem-
porarily being a humanitarian subject turns out to be mediated by digital-financial assemblages that 
enable the inserts migrants’ presence and mobility into data circuits. At the same time, the spatial 
and disciplinary restrictions of the asylum determine the specificity of temporarily financialised 
humanitarian subjectivities. 
The temporary financialisation of refugee lives is characterised by a twofold power mechanism: 
spatial discipline – complying with the double spatial restriction to stay in the country and to live in 
reception centres – and temporary self-discipline – refugees’ ability to manage the monthly finan-
cial support. The temporary disciplining of migration through financial-humanitarian logics is actu-
alized also through obligations of spatial fixation. The prepaid cards monthly top-up is conditional 
to the spatial restrictions imposed by the refugee reception system: migrants need to accept the ac-
commodation offered to them by Greek authorities; those who opt out of the hosting system or who 
escape refugee camps are not entitled to cash assistance. In 2017 many refugees used to live in the 
Refugee City Plaza, a hotel that was occupied by locals and refugee support groups and that in April 
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2016 was transformed into a shared place and a shelter for migrants in the centre of Athens. Most of 
the residents at City Plaza were people waiting for responses to their asylum applications, and thus 
were eligible for Refugee Cash Assistance.  
Yet, migrants’ choice not to stay in refugee camps and to live instead on their own economic means 
in the urban context, automatically excluded them from monthly financial support. Actually, mi-
grants’ refusals to accept the spatial limitations and conditions of the national reception system are 
actually widespread. Many migrants do refuse to live in camps as well as in apartments which are 
located far away from the city center and where it is hard for them to build an economically inde-
pendent life as well as to develop social networks. In other cases,  refusals are based on the fear of 
being subjected to daily control, mainly consisting in geographical and freedom restrictions – e.g. 
prohibitions on staying outside the centres for more than fixed number of days; disciplinary rules to 
follow; surveilled entry-exit from the centres (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Pinelli, 2017). Migrants’ re-
fusal to live in refugee camps and reception centres often implicates a substantial exclusion from 
the channels of asylum as such. Thus, the geographical restrictions imposed on asylum seekers for 
getting access to financial support should be analysed as part of a much broader nexus between spa-
tial fixations, humanitarian refugee housing and forced mobility. Spatial restrictions, the obligation 
to stay inside the reception system and data extraction from refugees’ conducts and mobility define 
the temporary cartography of financial-humanitarianism.  
Hence, while the financialisation of refugee support is presented by the UNHCR as a strategy for 
“pushing asylum seekers to be autonomous and not to rely on external assistance” , in practice it 12
enforces a spatial discipline obliging migrants to stay in reception centres or refugee camps. “Au-
tonomy” is by now a catchword in the official documents published about refugees by state actors 
and international organisations. It is however precisely the meaning of autonomy in the field of 
refugee support that needs to be critically questioned, in particular in relation to “freedom”. As the 
Greek refugee context demonstrates, a refugee’s path towards autonomy is not framed in terms of 
freedom of movement, nor as freedom of choice – about where and how to settle. The spatial re-
strictions imposed on asylum seekers in Greece represent the material and situated evidence of a 
much broader trend in the analyses and programmes on refugee governmentality: autonomy and 
freedom (of movement and choice) are paradoxically disjoined from one another, since the former 
is conceived in terms of economic self-subsistence and, more broadly, as being the capacity to man-
age oneself. This is remarked on also by Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, who in their book Refuge 
 Interview with a UNHCR officer during the debit card distribution in Chios, July 16, 2017.12
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critically point to the increasing humanitarianisation of refugees, reduced to lives to be rescued and 
that are the object of  basic humanitarian support (food, clothes, temporary shelter), gesturing to-
wards autonomy as a condition to be pursued by state and non-state actors working in the field. Yet, 
what do they mean by “autonomy” ? Far from coupling it with freedom of movement, they stress 
that “there is nothing inherent to being a refugee that necessitates unrestricted global mobility or the 
ability to choose a destination country. The salient feature of being a refugee is the need for protec-
tion, not the need to migrate” (Betts, Collier, 2017: 62). By thinking autonomy as disjoined from 
freedom, such an analysis contributes to strengthen a governmental gaze on migration that takes for 
granted hierarchies in access to mobility and  presence in space. Claims to “mobility justice” (Cook, 
2016) are left out of the state narrative on refugee protection. Such a move, I suggest, relies on the 
fundamental wiping away of (in)equality of lives as a point to be critically discussed. In fact, as 
Claudia Aradau has observed, “the unthinkability and absence of freedom or liberty is linked with 
the absence of equality” (Aradau, 2008: 187). 
However, a focus on how refugees subjectivities are shaped by financial-humanitarianism does not 
mean overshadowing migrants’ struggles and resistances. While the implementation of digital tech-
nologies in refugee humanitarianism was supposed to appease potential tensions- between refugees 
and NGOs - through modes of governing at a distance, in reality the exclusion of many asylum 
seekers from the Cash Assistance triggered a series of protests. August 7, 2018: about 120 asylum 
seekers occupied the building in central Athens which was used by the UNHCR to deliver the debit 
cards. They organised the protest to get the debit cards they were entitled to . Their claim was 13
simple and radical at the same time: "debit cards for all refugees”. Through such a claim they poin-
ted on the one hand to the arbitrary exclusion of many asylum seekers, who matched the UNHCR's 
criteria to get the cards, from the cash assistance; on the other, they highlighted that all refugees, 
irrespective of the papers and of their housing status, must get access to this financial support.  
The cards were not considered a solution per se but, rather, were seen as the minimal but important 
support they could get. Importantly, the struggle for the debit cards functioned as a political catalyst 
for other related claims and struggles. First, about accommodations: in connections with the debit 
cards, refugees raised the point that many of them were not given an accommodation by the UNH-
CR and, therefore, have been forced  to live in a squat. Second, they seized the struggle for debit 
cards as an opportunity to carry on a protest against the technological barriers of the Greek asylum 
 For more details about the protest, see: https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-special-from-athens-we-were-13
forced-to-go-illegally-a002cf09990f; https://blog.refugee.info/athens-cash-office-closes-protest-delays/ 
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procedure. That is, they claimed for the suppression of the Skype call system. Indeed, since 2016 
migrants have been obliged to pre-book via Skype their appointment for lodging the asylum claim; 
due to the short weekly slot in which they are allowed to call, technical jams and extenuating wai-
ting time de facto obstruct and deter them from going on with the asylum procedure. The occupati-
on of the building went on for about one month and a half, when all refugees got their cards. What 
is relevant about this struggle is that migrants did not protest against the risk of being monitored 
through the tracking of their card transactions. Nor did they claim that the debit cards system was 
useless or bad. Instead, they highlighted their arbitrary exclusion from the system and the discipli-
nary coercion connected to it - the obligation to stay into an official accommodation. In this way, 
they foregrounded the effects of subjection generated on their lives. 
Conclusion:  
Through an insight into the Greek migration laboratory this paper has investigated the peculiar as-
semblages of financial tools, data circuits and modes of humanitarian control therein. As I stressed, 
a critical analysis of the Refugee Cash Assistance Programme involves situating it within a broader 
restructuring of humanitarianism which is characterised by an increasing use of digital technologies 
to regain control over refugee populations in transit. The focus on Greece has also enabled chal-
lenging techno-optimistic views on digital technologies in the field of refugee governmentality: it 
highlighted the disciplinary mechanisms and the spatial fixations which sustain the asylum regime 
and the hosting system, together with the multiple frictions that are at play in the infrastructures of 
data circulation.  The paper has explored the circuits of financial-humanitarianism by drawing atten-
tion, first, to the politics of data circulation and the related modes of value extraction and, second, to 
the ways in which refugees' subjectivities are affected and shaped by these political technologies. 
Migrants who currently get access to the channels of asylum in Greece turn out to be temporarily 
governable through financial-humanitarian tools and are pushed to act as if they were citizens - or 
to put it otherwise, as para-citizens and as active humanitarian subjects. This clearly emerges once 
we consider that the enhancement of refugees’ autonomy through the use of debit cards is posited 
by states and non-state actors in disjunction from refugees’ freedom of movement. 
While refugees’ temporary access to financial circuits is highly individualised – as predicated upon 
exclusionary criteria to be matched and on individual interviews – the beneficiaries of the debit 
cards are not individually controlled (although a disciplining effect is ultimately envisaged and gen-
erated). The peculiarity of the Greek context consists in the fact that financial tools have been im-
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plemented according to a logics of temporariness - that matched with the image of Greece as a 
space of transit for refugees - while in reality, due to multiple border closures, Greece has become  a 
space of containment where many migrants remain stranded (Tazzioli, 2017). If we can speak of a 
partial and peculiar financialisation of refugee humanitarianism, it is because of the implementation 
of financial tools for governing and shaping the conducts of would-be refugees,. At the same time, 
the circuits of financial-humanitarianism are constantly disrupted by migrants’ strategies for gaining 
access to Cash Assistance or, alternatively, to escape the spatial fixations imposed by it. Indeed, as 
the migrant struggle I reported above illustrates, a critical engagement with financial-humanitarian-
ism should bring attention to what  subjects who are targeted by these technologies, in this case asy-
lum seekers, define as and unjust. In other words, an analytics of the debit cards should be coupled 
with a critique that builds on how migrants' subjectivities are affected by or excluded from these 
financial and digital tools.  
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